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THE ADOPTION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY JURISPRU-
DENCE INTO THE ADMINISTRATION OF OUR CO.MION
LAW.
THIRD AND CONCLUDING ARTICLE.
CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN SURETIES. The rules of law in rela-
tion to contribution between sureties, under which an action of
assumpsit may be brought by one of several sureties who has
paid the debt for which all were bound, against his co-sureties to
recover from them their proportional share of the amount paid,
have been wholly imbibed from the doctrines of equity juris-
prudence.
This right of contribution was originally established in equity, as
having its foundation in principles of natural justice and equity,
since, in cases of suretyship, as all are equally bound, the payment
of the debt by one of the obligors is productive of a loss by him,
incurred for the joint benefit of all, which it is but just that all
should contribute to share.' Any other rule would give favorite
sureties the opportunity to collude with creditors in such a manner
as to throw the whole burden of the debt or engagement upon the
other sureties, to their own discharge.
2
Dering vs. Earl of Winchelsea, 1 Cox, 318; S. C. 2 Bos. & Pull. 270.
Story's Eq. Jur. 493.
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The equitable right of contribution between sureties having been
established for these reasons, was not considered as founded upon
any contract, express or implied, but upon the principle that
"equality is equity," which equity it was the duty of courts of
cliancery to establish and protect. Under the operation of the
rule thus established, therefore, if a surety paid a demand for
which co-sureties were bound with him, either upon its becoming
due without suit, or after it had been put in action and a judgment
recovered, he might maintain a bill in equity against his fellow-
sureties to recover that contributory share which each, upon the
principles of equity was bound to furnish.'
And it made no difference whether the sureties were bound by
the same or separate "instruments,2 or whether the surety seeking
contribution was aware of the existence of co-sureties at the time
of his entering into the contract,3 provided only that the engage-
ments of the different sureties were for the same principal and for
the performance of the same undertaking.4 And as an extension
of the principle upon which the jurisdiction of equity rested, if one
or more of the sureties became insolvent, the paying surety was
entitled to receive from the remaining solvent sureties, contribution
towards the payment of the entire debt, the insolvent surety not
being included in the estimate ;5 and if in any case one of the sure-
ties deceased, a bill for contribution could be maintained against his
representatives.
6
Oourts of law soon recognized the above principles of equity and
supported actions by sureties against their principals, which could
previously be maintained only in equity, and also permitted actions
1 Dering vs. Earl of Winchelsea, 1 Cox Reps. 318; S. C. 2 Bos. & Pull. 270; S.C.
1 White & Tudor's Leading Cases, 60; 4 Johns. Ch. 334.
Dering vs. Earl of Winchelsea.
3 Craythorne vs. Levinburne, 14 Ves. 163.
4 Coope vs. Twyman, 1 Turner vs. Russell, 426.
5 Peter vs. Rich, 1 Ch. Reps. 34; Hole vs. Harrison, 1 Ch. Cases, 246; S. C.
Finch, 203.
6 Primrose vs. Bromley, 1 Atk. 00.
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between co-sureties for money paid by a part of their number on
account of their guarantied engagement.1
This recognition was not founded upon any notion of the existence
of an 'implied contract, but was repeatedly declared to be deduced
solely from the maxim of the courts of chancery that in such cases
"equality is equity ;" and the principle was enforced by means of
that formal implication of promises, which about this time began to
come into favor in legal tribunals, and to be exercised in those
cases in which money was legally or equitably due, although the cir-
cumstances of particular cases might entirely negative and disprove
any such actual promises.2
The jurisdiction thus taken by courts of law was, and at present
is, more confined in some respects than its correspondent and
original in equity; at least in England, where, it would seem, no
notice can be taken of the insolvency of any of the sureties,3 nor an
action maintained against the representatives of a deceased surety.4
In the United States this restraint is not retained, and an action
at law would undoubtedly be sustained in cases of insolvency among
the sureties, and contribution enforced according to the number of
sureties remaining solvent,5 and an action could also be maintained
against the representatives of a deceased surety, by reason of the
obligation undertaken at the time the contract of suretyship was
made, and which upon the death of the party, evidently devolves,
both at law and in equity upon those who succeed to his rights of
property, and upon whom his other obligations rest.6 There is cer-
tainly no valid reason for preventing courts of, law from allowing
the insolvency of one or more sureties to be shown, to determine the
amount recoverable in a contributory action against the rest; and
it is an anomalous rule that would prevent a claim completely
'Cowell vs. Edwards, 2 Bos. & Pull. 268; Browne vs. Lee, 6 Barn. & Cress. 697.
"Cowell vs. Edwards, 2 B. & P. 268; 1 Saund. 264, n. (a.)
Cowell vs. Edwards, Browne vs. Lee, supra.
'Primrose vs. Bromley, 1 Atk. 90.
5 Harris vs. Ferguson, 2 Bailey, 397, 401.
6 Batchelder rs. Fisk, 17 Mass. 46-1; Bradhey vs. Burrell, 3 Den'o, 62 ; Malin vs
Bull, 13 Serg. & Rawle, 441.
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established at law, against a debtor, from descending upon his per-
sonal representatives.
UsEs AND TRUSTS. The passage of the statute of uses, and sub-
sequently the statute of wills, was the occasion of the introduction
into the common law of a system of estates in land, and methods
of conveying estates in land, which had been before unknown to
legal tribunalsw
Under the common law, no estates in land could be created with-
out the notoriety of transfer evinced by the solemn ceremony of
livery of seisin, which livery might be evidenced by parol, or by
the record of the livery, of seisin enrolled upon the charter of
feoffment, but no instruments in relation to the conveyance of lands,
unless purporting to be actual present deeds of conveyance, and
accompanied by livery of seisin, were of any effect in the transmu-
tation of title to real estate.' Neither could estates in land, to take
effect at future times, or upon given continguies, be limited by
the grantor of real property, except in a very few instances, accord-
ing to the strict rules of law in relation to contingent remainders,
which were liable to be defeated by feoffments made and recoveries
suffered by the persons possessing the interests previous to the
future and contingent estates. 2 Nor under the old limited system
of devising by custom, was any indulgence extended to dispositions
of land by last will and testament, but all such bequests were
obliged to be conformed to the rules of law in relation to other
conveyances.3
But under the system of uses, as it grew up previous to the reign
of Henry the Eighth, whether that system was introduced by the
English ecclesiastics, from the Roman law, for the purpose of
evading the statutes of mortmain, or invented by the laity, either to
avoid the confiscations attendant upon the fluctuating victories in
the pre,alent civil wars, or simply for the facilities which uses
afforded for devises and family settlements, estates were permitted
' Preamble to Statute of Uses, 1 Gr. Cruise, 347, 2.
4 Kent, 291.
3 Spence's Eq. Jar. Court of Chancery, vol. 1, 470.
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to be established, limited and conveyed, entirely contrary to the
rules of the common law, and in a manner unknown to that ancient
system.
In a conveyance of land from A to B, to the use of C, while an
estate in B was created, which was the only estate produced by the
conveyance that the common law could recognize, 1 the Court of
Chancery recognized the creation of another estate in C, who by
the terms of the conveyance was evidently intended to have all the
beneficial interest in the land, designated as the right to its "use;"
which estate in C, as admitted and protected by the Court of
Chancery at an early period in the history of uses, was a right to
receive all the rents and profits of the land, to demand of B, the
trustee, that he should execute and convey the legal estate and the
legal title to whoever C should request that it might be transferred,
and to compel B, in case of a disseisin and ouster of C from the
enjoyment of the rents and profits, to re-enter or bring his action
for the recovery of the estate.2 Under this system of uses, as
established under the sanction and by means of the Court of
Chancery, it was of course necessary that the legal estate granted
to the person who was to stand seised to the uses declared, should
conform in all things to the legal rules in relation to the creation
of estates at law. But a legal seisin of a legal estate having been
once established in the feoffee, the estates which were subsequently,
by the same conveyance, limited upon the seisin of the trustee as
uses, being rights or trusts in conscience only, and the creatures of
the Court of Chancery merely, might be declaredeto enure in any
way that would transfer the right in trust and conscience, and
therefore might be so limited as to create estates in the beneficia-
ries, entirely regardless and irrespective of the rules of law neces-
sary to be observed in the creation of legal estates. Not only could
trust estates be created in different persons, at different times,
according to the common law rules in relation to remainders, as in
the case of a conveyance to the use of one beneficiary for life,
remainder to another in fee, but estates of freehold for life or ia
1 Gr. Cruise 337, 3.
2 1 Gr. Cruise, 337-8, 6 and 7; Bae. Read. Stat. Uses, 10.
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fee, might be limited after the expiration of terms for years;'
estates in fee might be conveyed without the use of the word
"heirs; 2 estates might be created to spring up and attach in the
future, as in the case of a grant to the use of a man and such woman
as he should afterwards marry ;3 estates might be granted so as to
change from one person to another, upon the happening of some
future event,4 as in the case of a grant to the use of a certain per-
son and his heirs, until another person should pay him a certain
sum of money, and then to the use of that latter person and his
heirs forever ;' estates in use might be conveyed by any species of
deed or writing, and the transfer gave the grantee a right to
demand the assistance of the Court of Chancery in protecting his
interests.
6
. And as this method of conveying use estates was allowed, uses
became of course devisable, although lands were not ;7 and con-
veyances might be made to a trustee, to hold to such uses as the
grantor should by last will and testament appoint, which appoint-
ment, when made, operated in equity as a valid transfer of the
interest in the use. Lord Bacon observes, upon the practice of
conveying to uses, that one of its reasons was "because persons
acquired by that means a power of disposing of their real property
by will, which enabled them to make much better provision for
their families than they could otherwise have done."
'8
Such was the system of uses, and such its varying diversities from
the common law rules and common law limitations, when by the
statute of uses,,enacted in consequence of the gribvances alleged
to be produced by the practice of conveying to uses, and intended
entirely to destroy the whole system, it was declared by the Par-
liament of England that whenever, at that present time, or there-
after, any person should be seised or possessed of any corporeal or
incorporeal hereditaments, to the use of any other person, by rea-
l 4 Kent, 293. 2 1 Gr. Cruise, 343, 32; 4 Kent, 293.
1 Gr. Cruise 843, 33. 4 4 Kent, 293.
5 1 Gr. Cruise 343, 34. 6 1 Or. Cruise 342, 29.
1 Gr. Cruise 344, 36; 4 Kent, 293. 8 Bae. Read. 20 ; 1 Coke's Reps. 123.
9 Stat. 27 Henry 8, ch. 10.
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son of any conveyance or agreement, in every such case the person
to whose use the seisin or possession should be holden, should be
deemed and taken for all intents, purposes, and constructions of
law, to be actually seised of a legal estate in the same manner as
he was previously possessed of an estate in the use, trust, or con-
fidence, and should be deemed or adjudged to have the actual
possession of the land, in the same manner as he was entitled to
the previous use or trust thereof.'
The intention of this statute evidently being wholly to abolish
uses and to make all persons previously or thereafter possessed of
use estates the legal owners of the land, and seised thereof in every
respect, "after such manner, quality, form and condition as they
had before, in or to the use, confidence or trust that was in them,"
its effect evidently would be, and was, to introduce within the
cognizance of courts of law, those use estates and limitations, un-
known and contrary to their rules, but which had grown up as
equitable estates and limitations under the liberal doctrines of
chancery jurisprudence, and were now transferred and changed at
a blow, by the supreme law of the land, into legal estates and inte-
rests, which must thereafter be recognized and protected by common
law tribunals.
Under the operation of the statute, therefore, estates of freehold
might be limited upon estates for years, as in the case of a convey-
ance by A to B to the use of C for years, remainder to _D, in fee,
or to B and his heirs to the use of 0 for life, and at the expiration
of one year from his death, to the children of C forever ;-these
limitations, although directly contrary to the rules of the common
law, were yet allowed and took effect by virtue of the statute, at
the time designated, as actual vested estates in possession.-
Fees might be made to exist upon fees, and spring up, to the
destruction of the previous estate, upon the happening of some
contingency, as in the case of a shifting use, in which an estate
I Stats. at Large, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10; 1 Spence's Eq. Jar. 464; 1 Gr. Cruise, 348;
4 Kent's Com. 294.
2 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 481-2.
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might be limited to A and his heirs, with a proviso that if B should
pay A one thousand pounds at a given time, then the use to A
should cease and vest in B in fee,-upon the occurrence of the con-
tingency and the payment of the one thousand pounds, the legal
estate would shift from A and pass absolutely to B.'
Springing uses might be declared, to arise upon-a future event,
no previously existing estate being created to support them, which
uses would vest as legal estates at the time appointed, the use in
the mean time resulting to the grantor in the conveyance. 2 And
as before the statute of uses, when a feoffment to uses was made,
the feoffor might reserve a power either to himself or some other
person to revoke the uses declared in that feoffment and appoint
the feoffees to stand seised to new uses, which appointments being
matters of conscience, the feoffees were compelled by chancery to
fulfil,3 so after the statute of uses, courts of law concluded that in
conveyances to uses, powers might be reserved to the grantors, to
revoke the uses declared, thereby destroying the legal estates pre-
viously created, and to appoint and declare new uses to other
persons, and of different natures, which would be immediately
executed in the appointees, and the new -estates be legally vested
in them by the operation of the statute.4 Whenever such a reserved
power of revocation and appointment was exercised, the limitations
and estates originally created, instantly ceased and the new uses
immediately arose to the persons in whose favor the power of ap-
pointment was exercised, which uses were exercised by the statute,
from the seisin of the original feoffees to uses, from whom the pos-
session passed instantaneously to the appointee under the power. 5
And, as another instance of the effect of the statute, in the con-
version of equitable estates into legal, it may be stated, that, as
under the system of uses and trusts before the statute, when the
owner of land, for valuable consideration contracted to sell it, or to
grant a lease, by what was termed a bargain and sale, although
there was no conveyance, and no words of inheritance, yet the Court
of Chancery converted the seller into a trustee for the buyer, and
'4 Kent, 296. 2 4 Kent, 298. 3 1 Gr. Cruise, 843, 3 84.
4 1 Gr. Cruise, 364, j 6. r 1 Gr. Cruise, 364, 7.
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considered him as seised to the buyer's use, which trust be was bound
to execute; and as, also, when a person in consideration of marriage,
or out of regard to his near kindred, entered into an agreement to
settle his estate for the benefit of an intended husband or wife, or
their issue, or for the benefit of one or more relatives, which agree-
ment was considered a covenant to stand seised, the Court of Chan-
cery converted the covenantor into a trustee for the objects of his
bounty and considered him seised as such ;1 so, when the statute of
uses was passed, the legal estate in all these cases, since they came
within the operation of the statute, passed directly from the seller
or covenantor, into the purchaser or donees under the covenant,
and the conveyances were effected without the necessity of any
enrolment, registration, or livery of seisin whatever.
2
And as contracts of bargain and sale were valid, if in writing,
without being sealed or acknowledged, or it would seem even when
made orally, the effect of the statute would have been to allow the
absolute transfer of estates in land by simple parol agreement, un-
written, unsigned, unsealed and unrecorded, if the Legislature had
not, in the same year of the passage of the statute of uses, 3 pro-
vided for the enrolment of bargains and sales, and enacted that no
lands, tenements or hereditaments, should pass from one persoh to
another whereby an estate of inheritance or freehold should be
made by reason of any bargain and sale, except the same bargain
and sale should be made in writing, sealed and enrolled within six
months after its date. This statute in a measure prevented the
introduction of the secret method of transferring legal estates which
had been allowed in the transfer of equitable estates, but as the
statute applied only to estates of inheritance and freehold, it did
not affect bargains and sales for terms of years; which, although
not made in conformity with this statute, operated by virtue of the
statute of uses, to vest seisin of the estate for years in the bargainee,
who being once thus seised was capable of receiving a release,
which enlarged his estate, and the lease and release operated by
force of law as a total conveyance of the fee; which effectual ope-
•1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 452-3. 2 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 476. - 27 Hen. 8, ch. 16.
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ration of this method of conveying caused it to become the uni-
versal mode of assurance of the realm of England.'
EXECUTORY DEVISES. But although the effect of the statute of
uses-was such that the above mentioned equitable estates and in-
terests were transferred into the law, and made the subjects of
legal consideration and protection, yet, inasmuch as the intention
of the act was "to restore the good ancient common law which had
been in a manner subverted by abusive and erroneous uses," and
as one of the professed objects of the statute was to destroy the
system of devising lands then enforced through the medium of
uses,2 it was declared that the statute, by uniting the use to the
legal estate, had prevented the practice of devising by means of
conveyance to uses, and entirely abolished the system then in
operation.3
. The inconveniences, however, arising from this total destruction
of the right of disposition of property by will, which right, under
the auspices of the Court of Chancery, had grown to be so custom-
ary, and so indispensable to the interests of society; were so
severely felt, that in the thirty-second year of the reign of Henry
the Eighth, five years after the passage of the statute of uses, it
was enacted that interests in lands might be disposed of by last
will and testament in writing, duly executed;4 this statute, thus
again making a will of lands a legal method of alienation, after a
lapse- f five hundred years, the limited system of devising by cus-
tom, and the equitable practice under the system of uses, having
been for that period the only systems under which posthumous dis-
positions of real property could be made.5
In cases arising upon wills, after the passage of this statute, the
subject of devises having been so long and so exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, the rules of that court
were naturally regarded in the construction of testamentary dispo-
sitions,6 many of them being gradually introduced and admitted as
1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 476, 477. 2 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 468.
'1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 468.
32 Hen. 8 c. 1, explained by 34 and 85 Hen. 8 c. 5.
1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 469. 6 1 Spence's Eq. Jar. 469.
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principles of law, in relation to devises; and this liberal allowance
which was given to the exercise of the power of free disposition on
the part of the testators, was the occasion of the introduction into
the law, of a new description of estates, limited by devise, contrary
to the rules of conveyance at common law, and assimilated in a
great degree to those previously described equitable estates which
were recognized and allowed to exist as legal estates, under the
operation of the statute of uses.' By means of these executory
devises, which struggled gradually into existence, and were cau-
tiously admitted to be valid, fees might be limited upon fees, the
estate upon given contingencies to change and go over to some
other devisee, without the necessity of a resor4 to the assistance of
the statute of uses; as in a devise to A for life, remainder to C in
fee, provided however, that if D, within three months after the death
of A, shall pay one thousand dollars to 0, then to D in fee; this is
an executory devise to D, and upon the performance of the condi-,
tion the estate will vest absolutely in him in fee.2  And in the case
of a devise to the "heirs" of a person then living, to take effect
after his death, or a devise to a person to take effect at a certain
time after the testator's death, or a devise to a person who shall do
a certain act within a given number of years; the fee, although
given to commence in the future, is yet, in order to carry out and
favor the intention of the devisor, considered as a valid gift which
will take effect according to the limitation.3 And an estate for
years may be limited over after an estate of freehold, as in a devise
to A for life, then to B for ten years, remainder to C in fee.4
Executory devises being considered as substantive gifts directly
to the persons entitled to the estates limited, it was found necessary
to apply directly to the limitation of estates by will, the rule
against perpetuities, 5 and that rule as established in the cases of
the Duke of Norfolk,6 and Thelluson vs. Woodford,7 was that no
1 4 Kent's Com. 264, 265, 266. 4 Kent, 268; 10 Mod. Reps. 419.
9 4 Kent, 269. 4 Kent, 270.
5 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 471-2.
' 3 Ch. Cases, 1 Pollexfen's Reps. 223; 2 Ch. Reps. 229.
4 Vesey, 227; 11 Vesey, 112.
